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Abstract
Philosophers of different ages, epochs and ideological orientations
have engaged themselves in a heated debate on the issue of the
mind- body interaction. Indeed, there are two different but
interactive entities in man with different modes of action yet
interacting in the most subtle manner as to produce in a man , a mind
able to have effects on his body and vice versa. The mind body
problem is all about the nature and extent of interaction of these two
entities. When a person experiences a mental event, is there any
relation between the mental event and the person's body? Western
philosophers generally situate this problem on the platform of
substance, the central concern of metaphysics whose speculative
arguments and the static conception of reality have rent asunder the
train of Western philosophy. Thus many Western philosophers
approached the duality of experience by assuming that the subject
and object are two separate and independent realities. For the mind-
body problem two theories were advocated by the West: monistic
and dualistic theories. The African on the other hand conceives all
that is as 'force', which is the cosmic universal force, and only
modern, rationalizing thought can abstract from its manifestations.
This dynamic view of reality among Africans rejects the Cartesian
picture, the source of the notorious mind-body problem, which
continues to haunt scholars of Western philosophy. This paper
adopts the method of analysis and hermeneutics to investigate the
African conception of the problem vis-à-vis the Western conception
and the conclusion is that dualism is basic in explaining the
composition of the human person but not in the duality of dualism
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and conception of reality as being or substance.
Cartesian dualism is a logical or discursive rejection of the
interdependability between mind and body, and the implication is
that there is mutual exclusion of classes: there is no ground for
causal interconnection; reality (the world of things) is of two
opposite classes not that they are necessarily contradictory or
necessarily antagonistic; and that mind and body are separately
independent. Thus when we say that Descartes is the father of
modern mind- body problem, we mean that the implications of this
dualism have had enormous consequences on subsequent
philosophy of mind. To achieve roundly the aim of this paper,
however, the parting ways of the African and Western schemes of
mind –body interaction have to be adumbrated. This will be
followed by concise exposition of the Western schemes of mind-
body interaction; while the next step will articulate the African
conception of the interaction which will also anticipate a holistic
comparism of the two schemes of thought. We will then wind up our
discourse with the African response to the mind- body problem.
This will be followed by a concluding reflection. But we must not
hesitate to mention that the Kantian epigram today remains
indisputable that is to say that:
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To be human means to be a dualist, to live in two
metaphysically distinct worlds… the world
of objects that are governed by physical laws. That
natural world includes not only the starry heavens
above, but also our species of vertebrate metazoans
that biologists designate as The
other world is the world of subjects





That supernatural world is composed of persons. It
is in this existential sense of mankind living in two
worlds that dualism, which most … philosophers
regard as a long-deceased doctrine… but likely to
be with us as long as there are people around who
live as social beings.
The person's body is endowed with
properties shared with the bodies of the beasts. By
contrast, the person's mind is endowed with a set of
properties, such as uniqueness,
irreplaceability, sacredness, or being an end in
itself, and, above all, with free will. The mind shares
these super naturalistic properties, which are
beyond the reach of scientific study, with God rather
than with the beasts.
De Anima




Consequently we must settle with a kind of dualism in the mind-
body problem because we have no choice other than to consider the
beastly and the divine the natural and the supernatural, as
complementary aspects of the person whether these two worlds are
understood in the Stent sense of the natural and the supernatural or
in the Kantian sense of the phenomenal and the noumenal or
intelligible worlds the important thesis is that 'substance dualism' of
Descartes must be rejected or at most modified. Needless to
propound the anti-dualist doctrine of monism advocated by
Aristotle according to which mental phenomena are nothing other
than bodily functions because Francis Crick referred to it not long
ago as 'the astonishing hypothesis' and it fails to fathom the
ontological depth of the mind –body problem.
Something has to be said about the nature of the mind for clarity of
ideas. I submit that no new insight is gained by the appellation since




The Nature of the Mind
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actualizes itself”. “by mind most people mean
consciousness. As examples of the mental, they would take
pleasures and pain, loves and hates, purposes, memories, and
desires”.
“not to
philosophize in exclusivity since it would be extremely injudicious
to try to philosophize in self imposed isolation from all modern
currents of thought”. For
“the African must acquaint himself with the
philosophies of all the peoples of the world, compare, contrast
critically assess them and make use of whatever of value he may find
in them”.
And for Sheldon
For David Hodgson, it is an abstract noun referring
collectively to each person's mental events. Descartes had put
forward the substance dualism when he conceived the mind to be a
non-material substance – ' '.
To begin this part of our paper let us bear in mind the immortal
admonition of Kwasi Wiredu who exhorted us (Africans)
Wiredu, therefore, as for many other
philosophers of his ilk,
Hence, it is with a sincere attitude of philosophic mind
that we proceed to make a summary comparative reflection on both
the Western and the African modes of conceptualization of reality;
mind and body as well as their interaction an interaction that
exemplifies man's relationship with the multiplicity of being or
forces in the universe respectively. The clear distinction between the
conceptualization of reality; the mind- body relation in Western
philosophy and in African philosophy stems from three basic
factors:
TheWest makes bid to conquer the elements of nature, with the hope
that by so doing they would be of benefit to him, but the African
seeks a unitized bond with the elements. It is not difficult to see that
this divisive attitude of the West has led the philosophers therein to
argue about the separateness and sharp distinctiveness between the
soul and the body. The African, on the other hand, equipped with
holistic conceptual schemes finds no reason why the mind (soul)






The Western and African Conception of Reality: Points of
Divergence
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African, it is not only that the body and soul are co- functional; they
are substantially independent, with their distinct substantiality
remaining intact. The mind body interdependence in the African
conceptual scheme is ontologically founded since the vital force
diffuses two-directionally between the mind and the body.
The law of physics, as on the philosophy of physics, is that energy is
dynamic, that is, something that can diffuse or be transposed from
one part to the other. The acts of man are basically of the mind and
body as a unity- substantial and energetic. The foregoing, no doubt,
suggests the necessity for outlining and enunciating the African
response to the mind –body problem – a problem that the West has,
perhaps inadvertently tended to ossify. We shall begin with the
Western itemization of the critical problem in what follows below.
In the Western philosophical tradition the mind- body problem has
generated heated debate and
This is because of their
dualist and monist's conceptions of the nature of the human person
and this stems “from the ancient Greeks' conception to Plato's
speculative philosophy of man as a composite being down to Rene
Descartes through his “methodic doubt” in the meditations “
The mind- body problem is all about the nature and extent of
interaction of these two entities; and because, according to the
As we stated above, that over the years Western philosophers have
been divided based on their orientation and convictions, there are
two major camps namely the dualist school and the monist school,
that is, those who saw the mind and body as two different or
The Genesis and Core Solutions to the Mind- Body Problem in
Western Philosophy
“is as ancient as it is yet to be totally
solved in philosophy and in actual life”.
has
brought this problem at the forefront of philosophical analysis”.
West
“the Mind has a mental character while the body on the other hand
is constructed under the underlying laws of physics and its
components obey the well enumerated laws of physiology. So it is
this characteristic difference between these two, mind and body that





independent realities and those who explain it as one principle or
entity. Philosophically and theologically one agrees with Stent that:
Much has been written by the West to proffer solutions to the
problem ranging from
This conceptual scheme of mind body interactions, the
“most notorious” of all dualist solutions to the mind –body problem
styled
This was borrowed by his disciples
The announcement of the death of dualism is
premature. Its obituary notices merely reflect the
failure of the aficionados of monism to fathom the
ontological dept of the mind body problem. However
incisive and illuminating may have been the
neurobiological progress made during the present
Decade of the Brain proclaimed by President
George Bush, monism remains the ontologically
unsatisfactory solution of the mind- body problem
that it has always been … While monism may be an
adequate, or maybe even the only, way to deal with
mind as a natural phenomenon, it cannot give a
satisfactory account of mind as a moral
phenomenon. For such an ontological satisfying
account, dualism has to be invoked.
“idealist solution, stating that there is only
mind and as such body/matter is merely a manifestation of the mind.
The greatest proponent of this idealist ideology is Berkeley…. This
position however hits some rock when one considers how the mind
alone could have created the beautiful subtlety of the unification,
the nuclear energy, and the electromagnetic and radioactive forces
of nature”. “This problem persisted until it became a concern of
metaphysicians in modern era in the history of western philosophy.
And the tallest figure during this time was Rene Descartes…His
views in this regard resulted to a dualistic thesis called Cartesian
Dualism …which created a clear dichotomy between the soul and
the body”.
“substance dualism put forward by Rene Descartes in the
mid-seventeenth century. He proposed that the world is composed of
two distinct substances –the res extensa of matter and the non-






namelyArnold Geulinex and Nicholas Malebranch but with a slight
modification in the sense that “they followed his dualism and
conceived the mind and the body to be two separate distinct
substances”, but differed on the manner of interaction which
Descartes explanation offered which compounded the problem'.
They sought solution to the problem by:
When these dualist philosophers failed to use the dualistic
principles in explaining the mind –body problem due to deep seated
criticisms from the group of philosophers who held that the
interaction is not liable to observation, many theories were
advanced by philosophers ranging from Behaviorist doctrine
which in order to solve the dichotomy caused by the dualists averred
that
By so doing they cast
overboard the structures like correlation or co-occurrence or
correspondence but asserted identity in their stead. The west also
floated a recent theory, functionalism and George Henry Lewes was
its prominent proponent and their central thesis is that
The mind – body problem in the west is primarily founded on the
disparity of the natures of mind and body. The mind has the nature of
spirituality while the body has the nature of materiality with its
attendant problem of how could spirituality and materiality
interacts? The problem assumed a more difficult dimension with
Taking a theological dimension, they argued that the
mind cannot move the body contrary to Cartesian
postulation because the two has distinct ontological
status. They attributed the experience of the mind
and the body to God. For them only God moves the
body to conform to the will of the mind, for the soul is
united with God and not with the body, so it cannot
move the body.
“mind is sensational disposition of the individual to identity
theories which contend rather that each and every mental state is
identical with some state in the brain”.
, “on the






Descartes' conceptual scheme of the mind as a spiritual substance,
the body a material one; while the former is characterized by
thought the latter by extension and both are in mutual exclusive
classes thereby formulating the mind- body problem on a higher
ground. Today, therefore Western philosophers generally situate
this problem on the platform of substance which is basically a
metaphysical subject- matter since for
and the determinant point in any case, is what this
substance is which is the central point of departure and division
among western philosophers. This is not so withAfrican conceptual
schemes and interpretation of reality. Rather theAfrican approaches
the mind –body problem very formidably and with adequate
schematic tools; rather than the Western substance, the vital force is
the basic thing in all existents. This makes a sharp contrast and
provides an adequate tool for resolving the critical problem, nature
and mind body relation.
Mind
In this section of our paper, we shall expose the ideas of some
African researchers and philosophers who busied themselves in
critical investigation of the nature of man and the mind – body
relation. The examination of such will reveal to us the material for
the understanding of the African response to the mind – body
problem. We are therefore going to sketch the philosophical systems
of the Akan people by Kwame Gyekye; the Igbo by Metuh; and the
Bantu by Placide Tempels. This will be followed by the system of
African conceptualization of mind – body relation. This is because,
these systems apart from revealing to us the material for and the
possibility of seeking their common denominator, are valid not only
for the Akan and the Igbo and the Bantu, and not only for African
traditional philosophy but forAfrican philosophy in general.
Indeed, their contributions will serve as a kind of background for
our concluding reflections on the African response to the mind-
them “the central concern of
metaphysics is the study of substance, the essential nature of a
thing”.18
– Body Problem: theAfrican Response
9
body problem in African philosophy. But before we begin let us
reiterate that African philosophy is peculiarly marked by the
dynamic relation and interplay of the elements of reality as a whole.
This relationship, this interaction, is made feasible in the medium of
vital force that is the life force of things animate and inanimate.
Since this vital force is an ontological entity, it forms the basis for
this interplay of forces among all there is.
On the relationship between mind and body, a question the author
did not, as such, busy himself with; he made certain relevant or
poignant remarks. First of all, that is not a part of man, but the
“real self”. What becomes of the body, then? The answer is not that
the body is irrelevant to or (man, the beauty of
creation), but that it is only an abode of the spirit considered as the
real man or person and nothing was said that is capable of vitiating
the body's substantiality. In other words, a person, the individual
substance of a rational nature, can reincarnate from one body to the
other without losing his personhood since he could only be
undergoing these reincarnations in order to fulfill his mission on
earth.
To understand Igbo mind – body relation in the framework of
Metuh's interpretation
Thus
the mind – body relation is clearly interactionist since the
promptings of the , the characters of the and the affections
and volitions of the are all communicated to, and through the
body. On the other hand, whatever affects the body equally affects
or influences man's interior constitution. Hence, though Metuh did
not set out to work on mind- body relation whether among the Igbo
or any other tribes, we can unmistakably pinpoint his interactionist
contours in spite of their faintness. Nevertheless, the central point is
that the soul is
it is within this dynamic mode, that the trajectory of
Ikenga Metuh: Igbo Constitution of the human Person and the
Mind – Body Relationship
Mmuo
Mmadu mmandu
, “we should equally note that Obi is man's
animating principle and the seat of affection and volition”.
Chi Eke
Obi





man's relationship with the world is depicted, traced and his place in
it equally enunciated.
Since the soul of man, that is to say, the real man is a force while
other beings are forces as well; man's interaction with the plenitude
of beings is demystified. Man makes use of the subhuman species as
palliatives or additives to increase his vital force; and he can equally
manipulate these forces to diminish the other person's vital force.
Man, too, can influence the deities and spirits through sacrifices,
prayers and spells. Conversely, the deities can intervene in human
affairs to bring order and blessings or they can upset the human
order whenever their laws are not obeyed. And all these chain of
relationships bear on man's vital force, and as it were conducive
themselves into factors of the increase or diminution of vital force as
the case may be. Thus the vital force is man's channel of
fundamental relationship with the other. In fact, there is a
continuous exchange between all the beings in the Igbo world view
irrespective of the class of being (visible and invisible) to which
they belong.
Tempels' formidable study of Bantu Ontology presents us with a
typical African conception of beings and their mode of interaction.
And with this Bantu framework, the mind and the body assume a
unique mode of the interaction, one that attempts very closely to
resolve the Western mind body dichotomy.
Within ontological structure of the vital force, what becomes of man
who is spoken of as the strongest being of all creation? What
becomes of his soul and body and how do they interact? Now, the
Bantu distinguish in man, the body, the shadow and the breath. The
breath
The body is
the physical, visible and tangible physiological base of life. The
Bantu, however, regard the principle of life, the soul, not as part of
man, but as 'man himself or the little man'
Placide Tempels'Mind – Body Relation in Bantu Ontology
“is the assumed manifestation, the evident sign of life, though
it is mortal and in no way corresponds with what we understand by




hidden behind the perceptible manifestation of the man of the
'Muntu', which at death, has left the living”.
bintu
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To tackle the mind – body problem, Tempels observed that Africans
conceive beings as living forces. Being is always active, dynamic,
and not static. Nothing moves in this universe of forces without
influencing other forces by its movement. “The world of forces”
Tempels observed, “is held like a spider's web of which no single
thread can be caused to vibrate without shaking the whole network”.
Since being is a living force, interaction between beings may lead to
the reinforcement of the power of beings, or its diminution. Hence,
the Belgian priest, Tempels, cognizant of the Western causal
schemes and psychical causal interaction rightly understood the
Bantu's conception of the interaction of forces or beings as
transcending the confines of Western science and philosophy
wherein beings are understood as static, that is to say of forces with
forces». This is an ontological causal interaction following from the
nature of beings as forces in relatedness. One force will reinforce or
weaken another. Within this sort of relationship, where man has a
great deal of determinative power, the interaction takes place in the
natural plane. The are things which the Bantu see as forces not
endowed with reason, not living.
These material and immaterial powers are basically the organic
functions of the respective vital forces (of the component parts). The
material body and the immaterial soul are thus in the chain of
dynamic organic relatedness. The powers of the mind are therefore
made manifest in the activities of the body and the action, function,
disposition in theAfrican parlance, the body's vital force is reflected
in the mind and can either augment its respective vital force or
vitiate it. The unifying movement of the vital force from the soul, the
principle of life, to the body and vice versa, all the more constitutes
man as a unity.
Thus, the mind, which is the substratum of consciousness and
experience, makes for man not only an epistemic repertoire of
reality but also the interplay of relationship thereof. It follows that
not only do the mind and body, but the only the whole man and the
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rest of reality interrelate not just in the medium of the vital force
but equally on the front of man's 'ontological complementary
consciousness' as Asouzu would call it. Here, intentionality and
consciousness coalesce, not at all in the monistic sense, but in the
integral and integrating fashion.
Concerning the subject of our philosophical investigation Kwame
Gyekye of Ghana made a thorough going research among his
people, the Akan people and came up with an illuminating response
on the nature of man and the relationship that exists among its
various components. He actually set out to
and offered the vital
force as the dynamic channel of the mind body relation.
On the constitution of a person, for the Akan, man is composed of
,(soul) , (spirit) and (body). Gyekye is of the
view that the proper representation of the Akan conception of a
person is that he is composed essentially of mind and body rather
than the Akan tripartite view, namely soul, mind and body as the
earlier anthropologists took it to be. He therefore confirms his new
interpretation of the essential elements of a person when he
observes that
For Gyekye, the soul is
synonymous with the mind, that is to say he used the term mind and
the soul as one. On mind body relation among the Akan Gyekye
offered the vital force as the dynamic channel of mind body relation.
Since mind and body are forces, they interpenetrate and
compenetrate each other and are also bonded together such that
Nkemkia rightly concurs with Gyekye
The conclusion
from Gyekye's arguments is obvious, that
Kwame Gyekye's Mind – body Relation: TheAkan Response
,
“interpret, reconstruct
and sort out in a more sophisticated way the elements of the Akan
collective thought on the nature of a person”,
okra sunsum nipadua
“what happens to the soul (okra) takes effect or
reflects on the condition of the body. Similarly, what happens to the
body reflects on the condition of the soul
that “the mind is
conceptualized as… inseparable from the body and … as the faculty,
which characterizes human activity and is not located in space in
the human body, but is an integral part of man”.






body are no longer independent forces but are forces that
intermingle and interpenetrate each other the relationship between




In order to make an articulate and detailed presentation of the
African response to the mind-body problem, we opt; first of all, to
re-outline sketchily the labyrinths of the problem as the work
compounded it, beginning with its basic problematic. The mind-
body problem is primarily founded on the disparity of the natures of
the mind and body. The mind has a nature of spirituality while the
body has the nature of materiality. How could spirituality and
materiality interact? But the problem did not stop at this; with the
coming of Descartes, the problem assumed a different, more
difficult, horizon; the problems, as it were, set on a different plane,
though in a similar fashion. By 'substance', Descartes meant 'that
which has an independent existence'. God first, mind and body,
secondarily. While the mind is a spiritual substance, the body is a
material substance; the former is characterized by thought whereas
the latter is characterized by extension. Both are therefore in mutual
exclusive classes. Thus the question of mind- body relation was
formulated on a higher ground, whether solid or not.
Now, the African approaches the mind-problem very formidably
and with adequate schematic tools. As already said, the vital force,
rather than the Western substance, is the basic thing in all existents.
This vital force that constitutes the soul is not the vital force that
constitutes the body, but since they are all forces, having been
created by God and encapsulated in the singular unitized man, they
have their common denominator, so to speak, as the vital energy.
Thus the African mind- body dualism and interactionism, very far
from the Western brand is only, fundamentally, a matter of two
dimensional diffusion of life energy. The ontological basis of all
mind- body interactions is the transference of the vital energy;
something a Karl Jungian would like to call ` mental decisions
would not be possible without the transfer of the vital force from
bodily images of the mind. The body is a congenial ontological
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receptive of the mind's vital energy and vice versa because both are
all energies.
The barrier of the Cartesian substance is not encountered since the
African considers such apparatus inadequate for the task. The
Western mind- body problem is a building of a system in an unclean
ground, thereby creating a problem within a problem, a method that
is obviously unsatisfactory. Also, we can see that scientism at worst,
or at best, unguarded empiricism, has led the Western mind to
unprepared solutions to the complex problems like the mind- body
one. Descartes, a clear religious thinker, was markedly influenced
over duly by his mathematical intercourse with mere materials and
this made him to found his mind-body theory on the notion of
substance which he experimented with.
The fact of insignificant variations among African peoples is not
unaccepted provided we note
Hence, within the
spheres of man's relationship with other beings, a concern entailed
by the mind- body question, we find out that man is fundamentally
in the ontological strand linking all beings. For the African, man,
who is a unity of mind and body is bound to the spiritual or
supernatural realm by his soul and to the physical realm by his body
but the basic ontological strand; the vital force fills up the entity
called man. Vitalism is theAfrican systemic. Western philosophy, in
its bid to answer the mind- body question has veered off the track,
stumped distinctively by Descartes' notion and understanding of
substance. However, the idea of substance is a meaningful one only
that its explanation has been, for the West, vagary and wooly.
Thus, it is not surprising to find in Western philosophy very
divergent views on the question of substance. Those Western
philosophers who doubt the existence of substance, in the form of
matter, for instance, are thus so likely to be floating, at least,
apparently in their discourse on mind- body relation. This is
precisely because they either abandon Descartes' system entirely,
and by entirely here we mean along with his correct implicit
that “the general conception of man
as a unit and a life- force in vital relationship with other life-forces
in the universe is a characteristic feature”.27
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“belief”, or they employ the service of his inadequate apparatus,
not minding the inadequacy. Hence, on both ways, though not
inevitably, Western philosophy has offered a lot of
none—convincing theses on the mind –body problem.
While African philosophers have not claimed that they have solved
the mind-body problem absolutely, we can, at least, demonstrate the
unity of their system and the holistic approach to the issue, an
approach that has been very gainful, very formidable and no longer
distant from the answer. The word 'holistic', here, stands for two
distinct and independent, though, convergent things. It stands for
the African organismic system which is equally vitalistic, a system
where all parts play insignificant roles that are integrated and
unified in a singular being. The word equally means the African
method of approaching things in their wholes and not demarcating
them unnecessarily, and more importantly conceiving them as
dynamic. For the African, it is not only that man is a unity of mind
and body, also, the constituent of man not only stem from a basic
denominator but equally converge in the same vital force. Force is
that central point of thought at which everything in the African
universe are no longer conceived as contradictory; a central point
from where creation flows, from where there is a formula for
everything that can be conceived of. All essences, all things, in
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